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ARGUMENT 
L THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION'S ("APPELLEE") BRIEF DOES 
NOT ADDRESS THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 59-10-
103(l)(q)(i)(B) AND TO DECIDE BETWEEN CONFLICTING LEGAL 
THEORIES OF THE CASE. 
The Appellee's opposition brief argues that the issues as framed in the Appellants' 
initial brief should be reordered and therefore chooses to respond to issues differently 
than presented in the Appellants' initial brief. * This case, however, is an appeal from a 
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission ("Commission"), and the issues presented in 
the Appellants' initial brief are in the order and priority framed by the Commission's 
decision. 
Both parties in this case have referenced Utah Code Ann. section 59-10-
103(l)(q)(i) as the statutory basis for determining whether an individual is considered a 
"resident individual" and therefore subject to Utah income tax. Both parties have noted 
that the statute provides two independent ways (Subsections A and B) that an individual 
may be classified as a resident individual. Both parties have generically referred to the 
first approach (Subsection A) as the "domicile test" and the second approach (Subsection 
1
 Arthur Benjamin and Gail Benjamin are the legal Appellants in this case. However, 
Ms. Benjamin died prior to the initiation of audit, the Commission's appeal and this 
appeal. This situation may occasionally create confusion when the terms "Appellants" 
and "Appellant" are used. When the plural term "Appellants" is used it is meant to refer 
to both Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin. When the singular term "Appellant" is used it is meant 
to apply only to Mr. Benjamin who was the only party to be physically involved in this 
appeal. Finally, when the context requires a reference to Ms. Benjamin, she will be 
referred to by name. 
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B) as either the "statutory test" or the "statutory resident test". Subsection A, the 
domicile test, usually deals with fact patterns where taxpayers seek to change their Utah 
domicile or assert that a Utah domicile has never existed. In contrast, Subsection B, the 
"statutory or statutory resident test" applies to persons not domiciled in Utah who 
because of a set of factual circumstances, ownership of a permanent residence in Utah 
and a physical presence in Utah for part of at least 183 days in a year, may be considered 
as a resident individual by the State of Utah. These two prongs are not only alternative 
approaches to determining whether a person is a resident individual but they are in fact 
mutually exclusive approaches. 
As noted in the Appellants' initial brief, the Commission's decision made as its 
initial and primary finding that the Appellants were statutory residents due to the 
application of Subsection B. Furthermore, the Utah State Tax Commission's Auditing 
Division (the "Division") devoted the majority of its time and focus at the formal hearing 
to this same issue as well. The Appellants have raised as a matter of law the failure of the 
Commission to find that the Appellants were domiciled in a state other than Utah as a 
condition precedent to the application of Subsection B. The Appellants raised this issue 
several times, including filing a Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification seeking 
clarification from the Commission on this precise point. The Commission steadfastly 
refused to make such a finding. In its opposition brief, the Appellee stated rather 
cursorily that Commission was engaged only in a "hypothetical" exercise regarding 
Subsection B and therefore the Commission was not under an obligation to make any 
2 
finding. (Appellee Br. 43.) The Appellee contends that the Commission's application of 
Subsection B was presented simply as an alternative theory. This is an intriguing 
statement since this "hypothetical" examination consumed the major portion of both the 
Division's presentation at the formal hearing and the Commission's final decision. 
The Division presented Subsections A and B as alternative theories to find the 
Appellants as resident individuals and therefore subject to Utah income tax. As an 
advocate, presenting alternative approaches is entirely appropriate. However, the 
Commission's role is not that of an advocate but as a decision-maker and as a matter of 
law its determinations cannot be made on hypothetical findings. It must decide which 
statutory basis is applicable and rule accordingly. The starting points for Subsections A 
and B are diametrically opposite and therefore mutually exclusive. If the Commission is 
to decide that the Appellants are statutory residents pursuant to subsection B then it must 
also find the Appellants are actually and not hypothetically domiciled somewhere other 
than Utah. Furthermore, that decision means that the Commission may not base its ruling 
2
 Matters based on hypothetical situations are considered unripe for decision under Utah 
law. See, e. g., Board of Trustees of Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
Keystone Conversions, LLC, 103 P.3d 686, 695 (Utah 2004)("Keystone's alternative 
argument presents an issue that is not ripe for review."); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)("Where there exists no more than a 
difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of [a provision] to a situation 
in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for 
adjudication."); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978)(Courts are not a forum for 
hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions); Houghton v. Dep't of 
Health, 125 P.3d 860, 868 (Utah 2005)("Because it would be inappropriate for us to 
address all of the hypothetical 'related questions' posed by plaintiffs, we will restrict our 
opinion to the appropriate scope of the [issue], addressing the related questions only to 
the extent that they have a bearing on the scope of that [issue]."). 
3 
on the application of Subsection A—that the Appellants were in fact domiciled in Utah 
and did not change that domicile. Conversely, if the Commission decision is based on 
the application of Subsection A, then application of Subsection B is foreclosed. 
The Appellee argues that this entire discussion can be avoided by simply finding 
that there is no matter of law at issue and instead simply having this Court examine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision regarding 
lack of abandonment of the Utah domicile. First, the Appellants strongly disagree that 
the determination of intent to change domicile is purely a factual issue and therefore 
governed solely by the substantial evidence standard. That issue will be discussed in 
more detail in Section III. However, the Appellee's desire to reorder the issues and avoid 
the discussion of which statutory basis is being invoked by the Commission is 
problematic. 
The Commission's decision should set forth the statutory basis for the decision. 
The focus of the Division at the hearing and the Commission's decision itself implied that 
Subsection B was the primary focus. Now the argument appears to shift to application of 
Subsection A. It is troubling that the Commission has not clearly defined the statutory 
basis for its decision and has steadfastly refused to make the appropriate finding that 
3
 See, e.g., Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 776 P.2d 
63, 66 (Utah App. 1989)("The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: (a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; (b) the agency has 
acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; (c) the agency has not decided all 
of the issues requiring resolution; (d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law...."). 
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defines the starting point for its decision. That fact alone is a basis for reversal of the 
Commission's decision or at a minimum is a basis for a remand to determine which 
statutory subsection is applicable. 
II. THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS IS TIED TO DOMICILE AND IF 
THE APPELLANTS ARE DEEMED TO BE RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS BY 
APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION B, THE STATE OF UTAH MAY NOT TAX 
THE CAPITAL GAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SALE OF THE DATAMARK 
STOCK. 
If the Appellants are deemed to be resident individuals under Subsection B, the 
capital gains associated with the DataMark stock are not taxable. In asserting that 
Subsection B residency subjects all of a taxpayer's worldwide income to Utah tax, 
Appellee both erroneously negates the language of Subsection B and erroneously applies 
Utah tax jurisdiction to matters clearly within the taxing jurisdiction of other states. 
As Appellee correctly states, "[a] statute should be interpreted to have meaning." 
(Appellee Br. 35.) However, Appellee's desired construction of Subsection B, that 
statutory residency subjects a taxpayer's worldwide income to Utah tax, would give 
Subsection B's domicile requirement no meaning at all. This construction would make 
tax domicile, whether inside or outside of Utah, completely irrelevant. If the legislature 
intended Subsection B to be read as Appellee asserts, a finding of domicile would be 
completely unnecessary. The fact that Subsection B by its terms includes a requirement 
that it applies only to taxpayers with a tax domicile outside of Utah requires a 
determination that some tax attributes of these taxpayers must be different from Utah 
residents, or this term would have no meaning. 
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Appellee's proposed construction would also have Utah taxing income that has no 
nexus with Utah and a clear nexus with other states. A student domiciled in Idaho who 
sells stock to finance her education would have those stock gains taxed in Idaho—unless 
the student enrolls in school in Utah and spends 183 days here, in which event Appellee 
would assert that the gain should be taxed in Utah. A Canadian university professor with 
Canadian dividend and interest income would be taxed in Canada on that income—unless 
she was teaching during a sabbatical in Utah, in which event Appellee would have that 
income taxed in Utah. A California domiciliary selling real property in California would 
be subject to California tax on that sale—unless he was providing religious services in 
Utah for 183 days, in which event Appellee would have Utah tax that income. Someone 
from Arizona could find all of their income subject to Utah tax by virtue of having spent 
part of 183 days in Utah caring for a sick relative. Appellee's position would result in 
double taxation of many transactions with no nexus to Utah, simply because a person had 
a physical presence in the state. Subsection B expressly creates a distinction between 
residency and domicile, and the above illustrations indicate why that distinction must 
have meaning and why Appellee's construction of Subsection B is inconsistent with that 
statute. 
Appellee's attempt to negate the domicile requirement of Subsection B infects its 
remaining arguments as well. Appellee dismisses the application of Utah Code Ann. 
sections 59-10-117 and 59-10-118, which define income items subject and not subject to 
Utah tax, as applying only to non-residents. (Appellee Br. 34-35.) These statutes do not 
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make this distinction, and in fact describe items of Utah-source income that are taxable 
without regard to residency. These definitions of Utah-source and non-source income 
actually suggest matters on which taxation of non-domiciliaries and residents should 
differ. 
The Appellee further asserts that "most states" have a statutory test similar to 
Subsection B and that those states have applied those statutes to all income of taxpayers 
deemed residents. (Appellee Br. 36.) However, following that statement it cites cases 
from only two states, New York and Minnesota. The multi-state consensus asserted by 
Appellee simply does not exist. The Appellee further provides no information or 
argument regarding the issue of domicile separate from residency, for which Appellants 
provided numerous sources, beyond indicating that these two states don't recognize it. 
The assertion in Appellee's brief that "most states" have addressed this issue in a certain 
way favorable to Appellee's position is both unsupported and inaccurate. 
Appellee also seeks to distinguish the numerous cases cited by the Appellant by 
looking only at their statements regarding residency and ignoring their cited statements 
regarding tax domicile; in four pages the term "domicile", for which the cases were cited, 
appears only twice. (Appellee Br. 38-42.) 
Finally, Appellee asserts that, contrary to the language of Subsection B, the 
Commission's failure to find that the Appellants were domiciled outside of Utah was not 
error. It bases this argument on statements that Subsection B was "an alternative means" 
to determine the Appellants' tax status, that the Commission made an "implicit[] 
7 
assumption]", and that it "hypothetically" found that the Appellants were not domiciled 
in Utah. (Appellee Br. 42-43.) No cites are provided for these positions, and for good 
reason: not only do none of these statements appear in the Commission's decision, that 
decision in fact states the opposite: that the Appellants were domiciled in Utah. 
Appellee's argument, consistent with its presentation at the hearing, is based on the 
Appellants being considered statutory residents under Subsection B. The application of 
Subsection B by its terms, however, requires that the Appellants be found to be domiciled 
in another state, which the Commission expressly did not find. Appellee's argument thus 
requires that the domicile requirement of Subsection B be negated, which it seeks to do 
by negating certain of the language of Subsection B and adding terms to the 
Commission's decision that it does not contain. Appellee's position that the 
Commission's decision is based on these unstated assumptions is both unsubstantiated 
and in error, and conflicts with the express language of Subsection B. 
The Appellants have cited to language in cases from numerous states (many more 
than two) that tie the income from capital gains to domicile, consistent with the long-held 
standard of mobilia sequuntur personam ("movables follow the person"). Utah law, as in 
Utah Code Ann. sections 59-10-117(2)(a) and (e) and 59-10-118(5)(c) and applied to the 
Appellants, follows this standard and defines these gains as not being Utah-source 
income. Appellee's response seeks to tax this income by applying the statutory resident 
classification of Subsection B and give the domicile requirement of that statute no 
meaning. However, as Appellee correctly notes, statutory language—all of it—must be 
8 
interpreted to have some meaning. For the statutory residency classification to apply to 
the Appellants, they must be considered domiciled outside of Utah, and as non-Utah 
domiciliaries, income from their intangible assets is subject to tax in their state of 
domicile. 
III. THE APPELLEE'S CLAIM THAT THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BOTH MISAPPLIES THE LAW 
AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS. 
The Appellee asserts that this Court can avoid any discussion of the extensive 
legal issues involved in this case by simply validating the Appellee's claim that 
substantial evidence exists to support the Commission's decision. In addition, the 
Appellee dismisses any possibility that the determination of taxpayer intent for domicile 
purposes can involve both issues of law and fact. The Appellants disagree with both of 
the Appellee's positions. The Appellee's position confuses the question of whether 
substantial evidence exists to support various Commission factual findings as opposed to 
the Commission's legal conclusions. Implicit in this question is the deference that this 
Court should grant determinations by the Commission. 
In many Commission proceedings there may exist credible evidentiary differences 
about the facts. For example, was a contract actually signed by a taxpayer? Did a 
taxpayer actually physically reside at a particular location? In such cases, the 
Commission would be required to make a factual determination and its conclusion should 
be given deference on appeal. As noted in Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d. 177, 181 
(Utah 1997), this Court stated, "We give deference to the initial decision maker on 
9 
questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and 
weigh evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witness's recollections." 
In the present case there is simply little if any contest over the existence of the 
facts. Therefore a claim of substantial evidence to support the Commission's factual 
determinations is not particularly meaningful. The central issue in this case becomes the 
application of the facts in making legal conclusions.4 In such cases, this Court has stated 
that "the application of facts to reach legal conclusions is the province of appellate courts 
with no deference given to the trier-of-fact's determination." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. 
The Appellant strongly challenges the Appellee's claim that there is substantial 
evidence to support a legal conclusion that the Appellants lacked the requisite intent to 
change their tax domicile. "Substantiality" involves more than the assertion of a possible 
interpretation of selected facts.5 Further, "in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
reviewing court will not sustain a decision which ignores uncontradicted, competent, 
credible evidence to the contrary." WWC Holding Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 
In asserting that Appellants failed to marshal the evidence, Appellee misses this point: 
Appellants do not contest the facts found by the Commission, only the legal conclusions 
drawn from those facts. Because factual issues are not raised, Appellants had no 
obligation to marshal the evidence. Even if they did, the Appellants' opening brief 
adequately does so. 
5
 See, e.g., Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 553 (Utah 
1996)(The Commission's findings of fact are upheld only if the findings are supported by 
substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993)(When the Commission's action is based 
upon determination of fact, the Supreme Court views the whole record to determine 
whether the Commission's action was supported by substantial evidence, considering 
both the evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings and the evidence that 
detracts from those findings). 
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44 P.3d 714 (Utah 2002). The Commission incorrectly concluded that the Appellants did 
not abandon domicile in Utah because there were not sufficient facts to show an intent to 
do so. The Commission's decision, while making various factual conclusions, is virtually 
silent in linking these factual conclusions to the Appellants' actual intent. (It should be 
noted that the entire discussion of the domicile issue in the Commission's 28-page 
decision is 3 pages long.) This paucity of analysis is not clarified by the Appellee's brief 
which is still virtually silent on why certain facts are clearly representative of intent and 
other factors are essentially ignored. The Appellants also believe that this case raises 
significant questions of law, several of which are issues of first impression that merit this 
Court's clarification. 
The purpose of this discussion is not to reargue facts. The purpose is to highlight 
the deficiencies in the Commission's decision in terms of the following key areas: (a) the 
failure to clearly articulate why some facts are important and others not; (b) the failure to 
articulate why facts that support the Appellants' position are dismissed while others that 
may argue a different position are emphasized; (c) the failure to clearly state what are the 
determinative factors in its decision; (d) the failure to explain why factors not included in 
Utah Admin. Code R-884-24P-52 ("Rule 52") play such a prominent place in the 
Commission's decision when the Rule is supposed to guide the Commission's 
determination; and (e) the failure to examine the factual issues in light of the specific 
lifestyle of the Appellants and to link the cited factors to a showing of lack of intent. 
l l 
A. History 
As noted in the Appellants' initial brief, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed 
issues of tax domicile in only four cases, all of which were issued in the rather condensed 
time period of three years. O'Rourke v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 830 P.2d 230 (Utah 
1992); Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah 1993); Lassche v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 866 P.2d 618 (Utah 1993); and Clements v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
893 P. 2d 1078 (Utah 1995). Although this Court noted the fact-intensive nature of tax 
domicile issues, this Court affirmed that the entire objective of analyzing the case's facts 
is to ascertain the taxpayer's intent. Following the issuance of these cases, the 
Commission in 1996 promulgated Rule 52 and applied it to income tax domicile matters. 
Rule 52 contains "a non-exhaustive list of factors or objective evidence that is 
determinative of domicile." The Commission stated in its decision that the purpose of 
Rule 52 was "to provide guidance concerning when a person is 'domiciled' in Utah for 
income tax purposes." (Appellants Br. Addendum B.) It should be emphasized that this 
Court has never addressed how the Rule 52 factors impact the analysis or determination 
of intent in personal income domicile issues.6 Lastly, in 1997, this Court issued its 
decision in Drake and articulated the position that in many situations bright-line 
distinctions between issues of fact and law do not exist and that the examination of the 
6
 Appellee states that this Court has previously applied relevant portions of Rule 52 in 
prior cases. While some of the Rule 52 factors were mentioned in these prior cases, they 
were not incorporated and reviewed as part of any administrative rule since Rule 52 was 
not promulgated and applied to personal income tax cases until after these cases were 
decided. 
12 
critical effect of facts should be viewed as a matter of law. The Appellants submit that 
such is the case in tax domicile matters. This Court has never examined a tax domicile 
case in light of Rule 52 and the Drake decision. 
B. Lack of an Analytical Framework 
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that the objective of the inquiry is to ascertain 
the taxpayer's intent (Appellants Br. 22-23, fn. 4.): Did the Appellants intend to change 
their domicile? The application of facts must be tied to answering that question. 
Specifically, the Commission's decision itself must clearly articulate the linkage between 
the existence of facts and the lack of the requisite intent. It is the Commission's failure to 
articulate the requisite linkage between facts and taxpayer intent that the Appellants view 
as problematic. Without such clearly articulated linkage the Appellee's evidence cannot 
be viewed as "substantial" and can more appropriately be considered to be irrelevant in 
terms of showing taxpayer intent. 
C. Critical Questions 
The Appellants have previously raised four problem areas with the Commission's 
decision and how and/or whether facts reflect taxpayer intent. These areas of concern are 
also emblematic of the inter-relationship between issues of fact and law. As such, 
clarification by this Court is warranted. The first issue is the analytical starting point. 
(Appellants Br. 27-28.) The Appellants assert that the only relevant starting point is the 
actual way in which the taxpayer lives his life. Given individual characteristics, the 
13 
importance or relevance of some facts will vary in importance in terms of evidence of 
intent. 
For example, the Commission's decision states that the physical location of 
professional services (accountants, doctors, lawyers and financial advisors) is a factor to 
be considered in determining intent to change one's tax domicile. Given a fact pattern 
where a married couple with minor children are relocating to a new area, neither parent 
travels extensively, and their lives are highly tied to the family's new neighborhood and 
school/church activities, the failure to obtain local professional services in fairly short 
order after a move would appear to be inconsistent with a permanent change of domicile. 
However, a fact pattern involving a married couple with no minor children where both 
travel extensively and both spouses maintain personal and professional ties throughout 
the country and the world presents a very different picture. In this scenario, the lack of 
new location-based services would have limited probative value in determining the 
permanent nature of the move. Simply put, the facts surrounding the relocation must be 
viewed in light of how the taxpayer lived before the move and whether that same general 
manner of living exists after the move. 
It is worth noting that since the audit years in question the Appellant has claimed tax 
residency first in Texas and now in Florida. However, the factual circumstances 
surrounding how he actually lives now are not appreciably different than the 
circumstances associated with the move to Nevada in 2003. He still owns the Sandy, 
Utah residence. He still has Ms. Custer handle all correspondence, payment of bills and 
attend to other personal matters, and Ms. Custer is still based in Utah. Personal advisors 
and other personal services are located in and dispensed in all parts of the country, 
including Utah. He still makes contributions to organizations in Utah and other states. 
Lastly, he still spends personal and business time in Utah—although given the death of 
14 
The Commission's decision makes no allowance for this lifestyle distinction. 
Such a position means that the starting point of any analysis is not the actual intent of the 
taxpayer but rather some generic situation. The Commission's decision assumes that the 
mere existence of certain facts per se constitutes intent. The Appellants would assert that 
such a position is an error as a matter of law. 
The second issue is the lack of a clearly stated rationale for why some factors are 
cited as clearly showing a lack of intent but other factors pointing to the opposite 
conclusion are rather summarily dismissed. As noted earlier, both the decision and the 
opposition brief reference factors such as the location of professional advisors and 
services and bank accounts as indicative of the lack of intent to change tax domicile. Yet 
the decision dismisses the location of voting registration and driver's license as 
"inadequate" and the opposition brief states that changing one's driver's license and 
voting registration should be considered as a "perfunctory step" involving nothing more 
than "filling out a form." This statement is made in spite of the fact that a driver's license 
and voting are the only factors that by law can only be exercised in a single state and are 
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regularly considered by the Commission as a primary indicator of tax domicile. The 
Commission is obligated to provide clear explanations about why these distinctions are 
made—yet the Commission's decision in this case provides no such explanation. 
his wife, the extreme time commitments associated with her medical treatment means 
that his time in Utah does not approach the 183 day figure. Despite these near-identical 
circumstances, the Commission does not contest the Appellant's tax domicile since the 
years in question. 
8
 Obtaining a driver's license in Utah in fact requires an affirmation that the person 
claims Utah as their domicile. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2- 108(b). 
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What are in fact the determinative or critical factors in the Commission decision? 
The law requires that any decision examine the totality of the circumstances.9 However, 
that standard cannot be used as a shroud to hide the fact that there are certain factors that 
are driving considerations behind the Commission's decision. The importance of 
knowing these factors is whether the Commission is in effect asserting that regardless of 
circumstances the existence of some factors are virtually per se indicators of lack of 
intent. For example, testimony presented by the auditor at the hearing indicated that the 
primary factor for the auditor was the fact that the Appellants did not sell or try to sell 
their Utah residence. (Transcript at 225-227.) That same fact is the primary factor cited 
in the Commission's decision. (Appellants Br. Addendum B.) The Appellee's 
opposition brief focused extensively on the Appellants' decision to keep their Utah home. 
Third, the Rule 52 factors do not mention any requirement associated with selling 
one's home in the state of original domicile. The only housing factor mentioned in the 
Rule is in fact a comparison between the nature of homes in the original state of domicile 
and the new location. In short, leaving a single family residence and moving to an 
apartment in a new location would raise concerns under the Rule. Yet when asked about 
a policy requiring selling or trying to sell one's home before relocating, the 
Commission's response is to avoid any focus on any single factor as significantly 
9
 See, e.g., South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 61 P.3d 282, 286 (Utah App. 2002)("Upon 
remand, the trial court should consider all of the evidence necessary to provide a clear 
picture of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the drafting, interpretation, and 
previous enforcement of the ordinance."); Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 800 
P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990)(Failure of agency to make adequate findings of fact on 
material issues renders its findings arbitrary and capricious). 
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determinative. In its initial brief the Appellants noted a series of factors (several not 
mentioned in Rule 52) cited by the Commission in its decision and the consequences of 
complying with the Commission's decision. The Appellee's opposition brief addresses 
the issues, not by disagreeing with the Appellants' assessment, but by stating that the 
factors mentioned were not "conclusive to the Commission's decision". (Appellee Br. 
31.) That response begs the question: What factors were conclusive to the 
Commission's decision? The Appellants previously sought clarification in their Petition 
for Reconsideration and Clarification about the role not selling their Utah residence 
played in the Commission's decision. The Commission stated that it was not a 
determinative factor but one of many. These answers elevate convenience over 
clarification. Obviously some factors are determinative and the Commission is obligated 
to acknowledge and explain the impact of these determinative factors. 
Lastly, the Commission's decision fails to link the facts it cites in its decision with 
its conclusion that the Appellants lacked the requisite intent to change their tax domicile. 
Rather, the Commission's position appears to be that mere existence of these facts 
constitutes intent per se without further comment. This situation is particularly 
problematic when, as noted in the Appellants' initial brief, uncontroverted explanations 
and evidence were presented disproving any linkage between these facts and lack of the 
requisite intent. 
A perfect example is the fact that the Appellant employs a personal assistant, 
Marcia Custer, to handle correspondence, pay bills and address other personal needs. (It 
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is this personal assistant that the Appellee refers to as a "concierge service"; Appellee Br. 
13.) Ms. Custer lived in Utah during the audit period and still lives in Utah today while 
handling the same issues for the Appellant—even though he has been a legal resident of 
two other states after leaving Utah (a fact not challenged by the Commission). In other 
words, there is simply no linkage between Ms. Custer's responsibilities, her state of 
residence, and the Appellants' tax domicile. This fact was explained in detail as part of 
the hearing record including Ms. Custer's personal testimony. (Transcript 134-151.) Yet 
the fact that the Appellant had a personal assistant located in Utah who handled personal 
matters is repeatedly referred to as evidence of the Appellants' lack of intent to change 
their tax domicile. 
D. The Orton Case 
In the initial brief, the Appellants provided an analysis of the four key Utah 
Supreme Court cases dealing with tax domicile. These cases are also mentioned earlier in 
this brief. The Appellants' initial brief distinguished those cases from the present case. It 
was noted that these four cases were not close calls in terms of their eventual outcome but 
highlighted the profound factual distinctions between those cases and the present case. 
The Appellee has asserted, however, that the Orton case is similar and its outcome which 
found that Mr. Orton was a Utah resident should also apply to the present case. 
In fact, the differences between Orton case and the present case are glaring. At its 
core, the Orton case is that of a married couple living apart with Mr. Orton supporting his 
wife who continued to live in the Utah family home while Mr. Orton lived in an 
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employer-provided dormitory in Nevada. For the tax years in question, Mr. and Mrs. 
Orton filed joint federal tax returns listing their Parowan, Utah address as their joint legal 
residence. Furthermore, Mr. Orton claimed his Nevada expenses as "away from home 
expenses" on their joint tax returns. All utilities and other operational expenses for the 
Utah home were listed in Mr. Orton5s name and he provided the funds to support his wife 
in Utah. Mr. Orton also returned frequently to Utah and during these Utah visits stayed at 
his family residence in Parowan. Mr. Orton did obtain a Nevada driver's license and 
registered to vote in Nevada. He also registered a vehicle and firearms in Nevada. See 
Orton, 864 P.2d at 906. The Appellee argues that Orton minimizes the importance of 
voter registration and driver's license as factors in determining domicile. Furthermore, 
the assertion is made that Mr. Orton's use of a Nevada employer-provided dormitory is 
only different than the Appellants' purchase of their Nevada home because of the 
Appellants' financial resources. 
Both voter registration and driver's license location are factors noted specifically 
in Rule 52. This Court noted their importance in all four of the previously cited cases 
(O'Rourke; Lassche; Clements; and Orton). In all but Orton the state issuing the drivers' 
license and the state of voter registration was considered to be the tax domicile. It 
appears that in Orton the Court found Mr. Orton's Nevada driver's license and voting 
registration to be matters of personal convenience rather than declarations of residency. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Mr. Orton, given his declaration of Utah tax residency on 
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his federal taxes, would have been eligible to legally obtain a Nevada driver's license or 
to register to vote in Nevada in 2003 or 2004 (the years in question in the present case).10 
The determinative factors in Orton were clearly the declaration of Utah as the 
legal domicile on the Orton's joint federal return, claiming Nevada living expenses as 
away from home expenses, and the difference in the nature of the Mr. Orton's Utah home 
(the couple's single-family residence) and his Nevada living accommodations (an 
employer-furnished dormitory). The Appellee's assertion that there are similarities 
between Orton and the present case because both listed a Utah address for mailing 
purposes and both involved multiple visits to Utah after claiming Nevada residency 
misses some profound differences. In Orton a Utah mailing address was employed 
because that was the family home and Mrs. Orton was responsible for the household 
matters. In contrast, the Appellants had their mail and other personal correspondence 
sent to a Utah address because they employed a personal assistant based in Utah to 
handle these matters.11 The multiple visits to Utah by Mr. Orton were to return to the 
family home and visit recreation property he owned in Utah. The Appellants, on the 
other hand, returned to Utah on business and because of Gail Benjamin's medical 
treatments. Lastly, the assertion by the Appellee that to reach a different conclusion in 
the present case from the conclusion in Orton is to unjustly reward the Appellants' 
financial status and is both at once incorrect and at a certain level quite troublesome. 
See note 8 supra. 
See note 7 supra. 
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Subsection E(3) of Rule 52 clearly indicates that "the nature and quality of the 
living accommodations that an individual has in the location claimed as domicile as 
opposed to any other location" is a criteria to be considered in determining domicile. In 
other words, if one lives in a single family residence in Utah and moves to an apartment 
or employer-provided dormitory in Nevada, that differential in living accommodations 
should be considered. It is speculative to assume that the outcome in Orton may have 
been different if he had the resources to purchase another single family home in Nevada. 
The fact that the Appellants purchased an expensive Nevada home while still 
maintaining their Utah residence should not be held against them. The fact that the 
Appellants' personal wealth enabled them to live a lifestyle unavailable to most is true. 
Few people can afford to move, not sell their existing residence, and at the same time 
purchase a more expensive home in a new location. Few people can afford to have other 
people handle their correspondence and personal bills, regularly maintain multiple 
residences, and have personal advisors and services available throughout the country. 
However, the fact that the Appellants had those resources does not mean that they are 
required to make lifestyle changes in order to change their tax domicile. Yet throughout 
the entire proceedings associated with this case, including the Appellee's opposition 
brief, there appears to be an undercurrent that to acknowledge the impact of the 
Appellants' resources is to unjustly reward them. 
For example, on page 11 of its brief, the Appellee states that the Appellants used 
their Sandy home while in Utah rather than staying at a hotel. Obviously they did—that 
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is why the Appellants kept their Utah residence in the first place, so they could use it 
when they were in Utah. There is nothing nefarious about that fact nor does that fact alter 
the Appellants' intent to change their domicile. It only means that the Appellants did not 
have to make some decisions that other people might have to make due to financial 
considerations. However, the availability of lifestyle options has no bearing on the issue 
of intent. The question of intent is tied to consistency in how the Appellants lived before 
and after their change of domicile. 
IV, THE APPELLEE'S BRIEF ARGUES FOR AN UNSUPPORTABLE 
STANDARD FOR FOLLOWING PROFESSIONAL ADVICE. 
The Appellee's brief states that it is irrelevant that Mr. Bassett was not retained by 
nor his advice sought by the Appellants. According to the Appellee, once any 
professional advice is actually given, the person who hears or reads any unsolicited 
advice is obligated to follow it. Furthermore, failure to adhere to such unsolicited advice 
constitutes negligence per se. It is difficult to find any credible legal or policy rationale 
for this assertion. 
It should be noted that the Appellee's brief is completely silent as to the conflict of 
interest associated with this advice. Furthermore, the Appellee's position assumes that 
the Appellants spent more than 183 days in Utah in blatant disregard of the unsolicited 
advice. In fact, his time in Utah was largely driven because of medical treatment for his 
wife—not blatant disregard of the unsolicited advice. 
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Finally, the Appellants, both as part of the record and in the initial brief, have 
explained in detail the circumstances surrounding their signatures on various documents. 
It is difficult to see how the unique nature of these circumstances, particularly where the 
Appellant signed certain documents in the immediate aftermath of his wife's death, can 
be construed as negligence on the part of the Appellants. The Appellee's position is 
particularly interesting in that it assigns negligence to these actions by the Appellant, but 
it finds that signing voter registration and drivers' license application forms have little 
probative value regarding the Appellants' intent to change domicile and are to be 
considered as merely perfunctory actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee has still not responded to its failure to find that the Appellants were 
domiciled in a state other than Utah. Failure to comply with the statutory requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. section 59-10-103(1 )(q)(i)(B) precludes the application of this statute as 
basis for declaring the Appellants resident individuals for personal income tax purposes. 
In addition, in its application of Utah Code Ann. section 59-10-103(1 )(q)(i) the 
Commission has asserted two conflicting statutory bases for declaring the Appellants 
resident individuals for taxation purposes. Subsections A and B of this statute are 
mutually exclusive and preclude the Commission from applying both subsections to the 
Appellants. This Court should reverse the Commission's determination that the 
Appellants were resident individuals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-10-
103(l)(q)(i)(B). In addition, the failure to clearly state the statutory basis for asserting 
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that Appellants were resident individuals is a basis for this case to be remanded to the 
Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Appellee's assertion that substantial evidence exists to support the 
Commission's decision misconstrues Utah law. The issue is not whether substantial 
evidence exists to support various factual conclusions. The issue is whether the various 
factual conclusions support key legal conclusions—specifically that the Appellants did 
not intend to change their tax domicile. The failure to show the existence of substantial 
evidence to support the legal conclusion that intended to change their tax domicile is 
reversible error and therefore the Commission's decision should be reversed. 
Finally, the Appellee has strained to establish a new standard of reliance on 
unsolicited advice as a basis for imposition of a negligence penalty. Nothing in the 
record of this case supports a determination that the Appellants acted negligently and 
therefore the Commission's conclusion should be reversed. 
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